In 16], J. Patarin designed a new scheme, called \Oil and Vinegar", for computing asymmetric signatures. It is very simple, can be computed very fast (both in secret and public key) and requires very little RAM in smartcard implementations. The idea consists in hiding quadratic equations in n unknowns called \oil" and v = n unknowns called \vinegar" over a nite eld K, with linear secret functions. This original scheme was broken in 10] by A. Kipnis and A. Shamir. In this paper, we study some very simple variations of the original scheme where v > n (instead of v = n). These schemes are called \Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar" (UOV), since we have more \vinegar" unknowns than \oil" unknowns. We show that, when v ' n, the attack of 10] can be extended, but when v 2n for example, the security of the scheme is still an open problem. Moreover, when v ' n 2 2 , the security of the scheme is exactly equivalent (if we accept a very natural but not proved property) to the problem of solving a random set of n quadratic equations in n 2 2 unknowns (with no trapdoor).
for example) have suggested some public key schemes where the public key is given as a set of multivariate quadratic (or higher degree) equations over a small nite eld K.
The general problem of solving such a set of equations is NP-hard (cf 8]) (even in the quadratic case).
Moreover, when the number of unknowns is, say, n 16, the best known algorithms are often not signi cantly better than exhaustive search (when n is very small, Gr obner bases algorithms might be e cient, cf 6]). The schemes are often very e cient in terms of speed or RAM required in a smartcard implementation. (However, the length of the public key is generally 1 Kbyte. Nevertheless it is sometimes useful to notice that secret key computations can be performed without the public key). The most serious problem is that, in order to introduce a trapdoor (to allow the computation of signatures or to allow the decryption of messages when a secret is known), the generated set of public equations generally becomes a small subset of all the possible equations and, in many cases, the algorithms have been broken 18] , 20]), and also in many cases, some very simple variations have been suggested in order to repair the schemes. Therefore, at the present, we do not know whether this idea of designing public key algorithms with multivariate polynomials over small nite elds is a very powerful idea (where only some too simple schemes are insecure) or not. In this paper, we will present two new schemes: UOV and HFEV. UOV is a very simple scheme: the original Oil and Vinegar signature scheme (of 16]) was broken (see 10] ), but if we have signi cantly more \vinegar" unknowns than \oil" unknowns (a de nition of the \oil" and \vinegar" unknowns can be found in section 2), then the attack of 10] does not work and the security of this more general scheme (called UOV) is still an open problem. Moreover, we show that, when we have approximately n 2 2 vinegar unknowns for n oil unknowns, the security of UOV is exactly equivalent (if we accept a natural but not proved property) to the problem of solving a random set of n quadratic equations in n 2 2 unknowns (with no trapdoor). This result suggests that some partial proof of security (related to some simple to describe and supposed very di cult to solve problems) might be found for some schemes with multivariate polynomials over a nite eld.
However, we show that most of the systems of n quadratic equations in n 2 (or more) variables can be solved in polynomial complexity... As a result, at the present, we rather recommend v ' 3n for example than v ' n 2 2 for security in UOV. We also study Oil and Vinegar schemes of degree three (instead of two). HFEV combines the ideas of HFE (of 14]) and of vinegar variables. HFEV looks more e cient than the original HFE scheme.
2 The (Original and Unbalanced) Oil and Vinegar of degree two Let K = F q be a small nite eld (for example K = F 2 ). Let n and v be two integers. The message to be signed (or its hash) is represented as an element of K n , denoted by y = (y 1 ; :::; y n ). Typically, q n ' 2 128 . The signature x is represented as an element of K n+v denoted by x = (x 1 ; :::; x n+v ).
Secret key
The secret key is made of two parts:
1. A bijective and a ne function s : K n+v ! K n+v . By \a ne", we mean that each component of the output can be written as a polynomial of degree one in the n + v input unknowns, and with coe cients in K. The coe cients ijk , ijk , ij , 0 ij and i are the secret coe cients of these n equations. The values a 1 , ..., a n (the \oil" unknowns) and a 0 1 , ..., a 0 v (the \vinegar" unknowns) lie in K. Note that these equations (S) contain no terms in a i a j .
Computation of a signature (with the secret key)
The computation of a signature x of y is performed as follows:
Step 1: We nd n unknowns a 1 , ..., a n of K and v unknowns a 0 1 , ..., a 0 v of K such that the n equations (S) are satis ed.
This can be done as follows: we randomly choose the v vinegar unknowns a 0 i , and then we compute the a i unknowns from (S) by Gaussian reductions (because { since there are no a i a j terms { the (S) equations are a ne in the a i unknowns when the a 0 i are xed).
Remark: If we nd no solution, then we simply try again with new random vinegar unknowns.
After very few tries, the probability of obtaining at least one solution is very high, because the probability for a n n matrix over F q to be invertible is not negligible. probability is even larger.)
Step 2: We compute x = s ?1 (A), where A = (a 1 ; ::; a n ; a 0 1 ; :::; a 0 v ). x is a signature of y.
Public veri cation of a signature
A signature x of y is valid if and only if all the (P) are satis ed. As a result, no secret is needed to check whether a signature is valid: this is an asymmetric signature scheme.
Note: The name \Oil and Vinegar" comes from the fact that { in the equations (S) { the \oil unknowns" a i and the \vinegar unknowns" a 0 j are not all mixed together: there are no a i a j products. However, in (P), this property is hidden by the \mixing" of the unknowns by the s transformation. Is this property \hidden enough" ? In fact, this question exactly means: \is the scheme secure ?". When v = n, we call the scheme \Original Oil and Vinegar", since this case was rst presented in 16]. This case was broken in 10]. It is very easy to see that the cryptanalysis of 10] also works, exactly in the same way, when v < n. However, the cases v > n are, as we will see, much more di cult. When v > n, we call the scheme \Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar".
3 A short description of the attack of 10]: cryptanalysis of the case v = n
The idea of the attack of 10] is essentially the following: In order to separate the oil variables and the vinegar variables, we look at the quadratic forms of the n public equations of (P), we omit for a while the linear terms. Let G i for 1 i n be the respective matrix of the quadratic form of P i of the public equations (P).
The quadratic part of the equations in the set (S) is represented as a quadratic form with a corresponding 2n 2n matrix of the form : 0 A B C ! , the upper left n n zero submatrix is due to the fact that an oil variable is not multiplied by an oil variable.
After hiding the internal variables with the linear function s, we get a representation for the matrices Proof: E and F map the oil subspace into the vinegar subspace. If F is invertible, then this mapping between the oil subspace and the vinegar subspace is one to one and onto (here we use the assumption that v = n). Therefore F ?1 maps back the vinegar subspace into the oil subspace this argument explains why the oil subspace is transformed into itself by EF ?1 . De nition 4.2: We de ne in this section the vinegar subspace to be the linear subspace of all vectors in K n+v whose rst n coordinates are only zeros.
Here in this section, we start with the homogeneous quadratic terms of the equations: we omit the linear terms for a while.
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The matrices G i have the representation
where the upper left matrix is the n n zero matrix, A i is a n v matrix, B i is a v n matrix, C i is a v v matrix and S is a (n + v) ( Proof: a) follows directly from the de nition of the oil and vinegar subspaces. When a) is given then b) is immediate. The algorithm we propose is a probabilistic algorithm. It looks for an invariant subspace of the oil subspace after it is transformed by S. The probability for the algorithm to succeed on the rst try is small. Therefore we need to repeat it with di erent inputs. We use the following property: any linear combination of the matrices E 1 , ..., E n is also of the form 0 A B C ! . The following theorem explains why an invariant subspace may exist with a certain probability. Theorem 4.1 Let F be an invertible linear combination of the matrices E 1 , ..., E n . Then for any k such that E ?1 k exists, the matrix FE ?1 k has a non trivial invariant subspace which is also a subspace of the oil subspace, with probability not less than q?1 q 2d ?1 for d = v ? n. Proof: The matrix F maps the oil subspace into the vinegar subspace, the image by F of the oil subspace is mapped by E ?1 k into a subspace of dimension v that contains the oil subspace { these are due to lemma 1. We write v = n + d, where d is a small integer. The oil subspace and its image by FE ?1 k are two subspaces with dimension n that reside in a subspace of dimension n + d. Therefore, their intersection is a subspace of the oil subspace with dimension not less than n ? d. We denote the oil subspace by I 0 and the intersection subspace by I 1 . Now, we take the inverse images by FE ?1 k of I 1 : this is a subspace of I 0 (the oil subspace) with dimension not less than n ? d and the intersection between this subspace and I 1 is a subspace of I 1 with dimension not less than n ? 2d. We call this subspace I 2 . We can continue this process and de ne I`to be the intersection of I`? 1 and its inverse image by FE k ?1. These two subspaces have co-dimension not more than d in I`? 2 . Therefore, I`has a co-dimension not more than 2d in I`? 2 or a co-dimension not more than d in I`? 1 . We can carry on this process as long as we are sure that the inverse image by FE ?1 k of I`has a non trivial intersection with I`. This is ensured as long as the dimension of I`is greater than d, but when the dimension is d or less than d, there is no guaranty that these two subspaces { that reside in I`? 1 { have a non trivial intersection. We end the process with I`that has dimension d that resides in I`? 1 with dimension not more than 2d. We know that the transformation (EG ?1 k ) ?1 maps I`into I`? 1 . With probability not less than q?1
there is a non zero vector in I`that is mapped to a non zero mutiple of itself { and therefore there is a non trivial subspace of FE k ?1 which is also a subspace of the oil subspace.
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Note: It is possible to get a better result for the expected number of eigenvectors and with much less e ort: I 1 is a subspace with dimension not less than n ?d and is mapped by FE ?1 k into a subspace with dimension n. The probability for a non zero vector to be mapped to a non zero multiple of itself is q?1 q n ?1 . To get the expected value, we multiply it by the number of non zero vectors in I 1 . It gives a value which is not less than The inner term is an invariant subspace of the oil subspace with the required probability. Therefore, the same will hold for FG ?1 k , but instead of a subspace of the oil subspace, we get a subspace of O.
How to nd O ?
We take a random linear combination of G 1 , ..., G n and multiply it by an inverse of one of the G k matrices. Then we calculate all the minimal invariant subspaces of this matrix (a minimal invariant subspace of a matrix A contains no non trivial invariant subspaces of the matrix A { these subspaces corresponds to irreducible factors of the characteristic polynomial of A). This can be done in proba- The last term is zero because x 0 and y 0 are in the oil subspace. This lemma gives a polynomial test to distinguish between subspaces of O and random subspaces. If the matrix we used has no minimal subspace which is also a subspace of O, then we pick another linear combination of G 1 , ..., G n , multiply it by an inverse of one of the G k matrices and try again. After repeating this process approximately q d?1 times, we nd with good probability at least one zero vector of O. We continue the process until we get n independent vectors of O. These vectors span O. The expected complexity of the process is proportional to q d?1 n 4 . We use here the expected number of tries until we nd a non trivial invariant subspace and the term n 4 covers the computational linear algebra operations we need to perform for evey try. :; x 0 n+v ) is an \Oil and Vinegar" system (i.e. there are no terms in x 0 i x 0 j with i n and j n). 6 An
. . .
x n+v = n+v;1 x 0 1 + n+v;2 x 0 2 + ::: + n+v;n+v x 0 n+v By writing that the coe cient in all the n equations of (A) of all the x 0 i x 0 j (i n and j n) is zero, we obtain a system of n n n+1 2 quadratic equations in the (n + v) n variables i;j (1 i n + v, 1 j n). Therefore, when v approximately n 2 2 , we may expect to have a solution for this system of equations for most of (A).
Remarks:
1. This argument is very natural, but this is not a complete mathematical proof. 2. The system may have a solution, but nding the solution might be a di cult problem. This is why an Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar scheme might be secure (for well chosen parameters): there is always a linear change of variables that makes the problem easy to solve, but nding such a change of variables might be di cult. 3. In section 7, we will see that, despite the result of this section, it is not recommended to choose v n 2 .
6 Solving a set of n quadratic equations in k unknowns, k > n, is NP-hard
We present in section 7 an algorithm that solves in polynomial complexity more than 99% of the sets of n quadratic equations in n 2 (or more) variables (i.e. it will probably succeed in more than 99% of the cases when the coe cients are randomly chosen).
Roughly speaking, we can summarize this result by saying that solving a \random" set of n quadratic equations in n 2 (or more) variables is feasible in polynomial complexity (and thus is not NP-hard if P 6 = NP). However, we see in the present section that the problem of solving any (i.e. 100%) set of n quadratic equations in k n variables (so for example in k = n 2 variables) is NP-hard ! To see this, let us assume that we have a black box that takes any set of n quadratic equations with k variables in input, and that gives one solution when at least one solution exists. Then we can use this black box to nd a solution for any set of n quadratic equations in n variables (and this is NP-hard).
We proceed (for example) as follows. Let (A) be a set of (n ? 1) quadratic equations with (n ? 1) variables x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n?1 . Then let y 1 , ..., y be more variables. Let (B) be the set of (A) equations plus one quadratic equation in y 1 , ..., y (for example the equation: (y 1 + ::: + y ) 2 = 1). Then (B) is a set of exactly n quadratic equations in (n + 1 + ) variables. It is clear that from the solution of (B) we will immediately nd one solution for (A).
Note 1: (B) has a very special shape ! This is why there is a polynomial algorithm for 99% of the equations without contradicting the fact that solving these sets (B) of equations is a NP-hard problem.
Note 2: For (B), we can also add more than one quadratic equations in the y i variables and we can linearly mix these equations with the equations of (A). In this case, (B) is still of very special form but this very special form is less obvious at rst glance since all the variables x i and y j are in all the equations of (B). 7 A generally e cient algorithm for solving a random set of n quadratic equations in n 2 (or more) unknowns
In this section, we describe an algorithm that solves a system of n randomly chosen quadratic equations in n + v variables, when v n 2 . 7
Let (S) be the following system: The main idea of the algorithm consists in using a change of variables such as: 8 > < > :
x 1 = 1;1 y 1 + 2;1 y 2 + ::: + n;1 y n + n+1;1 y n+1 + ::: + n+v;1 y n+v . . .
x n+v = 1;n+v y 1 + 2;n+v y 2 + ::: + n;n+v y n + n+1;n+v y n+1 + ::: + n+v;n+v y n+v whose i;j coe cients (for 1 i n, 1 j n + v) are found step by step, in order that the resulting system (S 0 ) (written with respect to these new variables y 1 , ..., y n+v ) is easy to solve.
We begin by choosing randomly 1;1 , ..., 1;n+v .
We then compute 2;1 , ..., 2;n+v such that (S 0 ) contains no y 1 y 2 terms. This condition leads to a system of n linear equations on the (n + v) unknowns 2;j (1 j n + v): X 1 i j n+v a ijk 1;i 2;j = 0 (1 k n):
We then compute 3;1 , ..., 3 ;n+v such that (S 0 ) contains neither y 1 y 3 terms, nor y 2 y 3 terms. This condition is equivalent to the following system of 2n linear equations on the (n + v) unknowns . . .
Finally, we compute n;1 , ..., n;n+v such that (S 0 ) contains neither y 1 y n terms, nor y 2 y n terms, ..., nor y n?1 y n terms. This condition gives the following system of (n ? 1)n linear equations on the (n + v) unknowns n;j (1 j n + v): In general, all these linear equations provide at least one solution (found by Gaussian reductions). In particular, the last system of n(n ? 1) equations and (n + v) unknowns generally gives a solution, as soon as n + v > n(n ? 1), i.e. v > n(n ? 2), which is true by hypothesis. The remaining i;j constants (i.e. those with n + 1 i n + v and 1 j n + 1) are randomly chosen, so as to obtain a bijective change of variables.
By rewriting the system (S) with respect to these new variables y i , we are led to the following system: where each L i;j is an a ne function and each Q i is a quadratic function. We then compute y n+1 , ..., y n+v such that:
8i; 1 i n; 8j; 1 j n + v; L i;j (y n+1 ; :::; y n+v ) = 0:
This is possible because we have to solve a linear system of n 2 equations and v unknowns, which generally provides at least one solution, as long as v n 2 . We pick one of these solutions.
It remains to solve the following system of n equations on the n unknowns y 1 , ..., y n : Note: In characteristic 6 = 2, this algorithm will also succeed when 2 n is not too large (i.e. when n 40 for example). (However, when 2 n 2 64 and when the characteristic is 6 = 2, this algorithm requires too many computations.)
A variation with twice smaller signatures
In the UOV described in section 2, the public key is a set of n quadratic equations y i = P i (x 1 , :::, x n+v ), for 1 i n, where y = (y 1 ; :::; y n ) is the hash value of the message to be signed. If we use a collision-free hash function, the hash value must at least be 128 bits long. Therefore, q n must be at least 2 128 , so that the typical length of the signature, if v = 2n, is at least 3 128 = 384 bits.
As we see now, it is possible to make a small variation in the signature design in order to obtain twice smaller signatures. The idea is to keep the same polynomial P i (with the same associated secret key), but now the public equations that we check are: The quadratic Oil and Vinegar schemes described in section 2 can easily be extended to any higher degree. We now present the schemes in degree three.
Variables
Let K be a small nite eld (for example K = F 2 ). Let a 1 , ..., a n be n elements of K, called the \oil" unknowns. Let a 0 1 , ..., a 0 v be v elements of K, called the \vinegar" unknowns.
Secret key.
1. A bijective and a ne function s : K n+v ! K n+v . The coe cients ijk , ijk`, ijk , ijk , ij , 0 ij and i are the secret coe cients of these n equations. Note that these equations (S) contain no terms in a j a k a`or in a j a k : the equations are a ne in the a j unknowns when the a 0 k unknowns are xed.
Public key
Let A be the element of K n+v de ned by A = (a 1 ; :::; a n ; a 0 1 ; :::; a 0 v ). A is transformed into x = s ?1 (A), where s is the secret, bijective and a ne function from K n+v to K n+v . Each value y i , 1 i n, can be written as a polynomial P i of total degree three in the x j unknowns, 1 j n + v. We denote by (P) the set of the following n equations: 8i; 1 i n; y i = P i (x 1 ; :::; x n+v ) (P):
These n equations (P) are the public key.
Computation of a signature
Let y be the message to be signed (or its hash value).
Step 1: We randomly choose the v vinegar unknowns a 0 i , and then we compute the a i unknowns from (S)
by Gaussian reductions (because { since there are no a i a j terms { the (S) equations are a ne in the a i unknowns when the a 0 i are xed. (If we nd no solution for this a ne system of n equations and n \oil" unknowns, we just try again with new random \vinegar" unknowns.)
Step 2: We compute x = s ?1 (A), where A = (a 1 ; :::; a n ; a 0 1 ; :::; a 0 v ). x is a signature of y.
Public veri cation of a signature
A signature x of y is valid if and only if all the (P) are satis ed.
First cryptanalysis of Oil and Vinegar of degree three when v n
We can look at the quadratic part of the public key and attack it exactly as for an Oil and Vinegar of degree two. This is expected to work when v n.
Note: If there is no quadratic part (i.e. is the public key is homogeneous of degree three), or if this attack does not work, then it is always possible to apply a random a ne change of variables and to try again. Moreover, we will see in section 9.3 that, surprisingly, there is an even easier and more e cient attack in degree three than in degree two ! 9.3 Cryptanalysis of Oil and Vinegar of degree three when v (1 + p 3)n and K is of characteristic 6 = 2 (from an idea of 4])
The key idea is to detect a \linearity" in some directions. We search the set V of the values d = (d 1 ; :::; d n+v ) such that: 8x; 8i; 1 i n; P i (x + d) + 
By writing that each x k indeterminate has a zero coe cient, we obtain n (n + v) quadratic equations in the (n + v) unknowns d j .
(Each monomial x i x j x k gives (
Furthermore, the cryptanalyst can specify about n ? 1 of the coordinates d k of d, since the vectorial space of the correct d is of dimension n. It remains thus to solve n (n+v) quadratic equations in (v+1) unknowns d j . When v is not too large (typically when (v+1) 2 2 n(n + v), i.e. when v (1 + p 3)n), this is expected to be easy.
As a result when v approximately (1 + p 3)n and jKj is odd, this gives a simple way to break the scheme. . In degree three, we have a similar
property: the public keys are expected to cover almost all the set of n cubic equations when v ' n 3 6 (the proof is similar).
Public key length
If we choose K = F 2 then the public key is often large. So it is often more practical to choose a larger K and a smaller n: then the length of the public key can be reduced a lot (see the examples in section 14). However, even when K and n are xed, it is always feasible to make some easy transformations on a public key in order to obtain the public key in a canonical way such that this canonical expression is slightly shorter than the original expression. Remark: It is also possible to decide that the linear part is always zero. However, from a theoretical point of view, this may be less secure because we cannot exlude the possibility that some e cient attacks exist against the homogeneous Oil and Vinegar without nding the secret key (and without breaking the non-homogeneous case). On the equations, it is also possible to:
1. Make linear and bijective changes of variable x 0 = A(x).
2. Compute a linear and bijective transformation on the equation: P 0 = t(P). (For example, the new rst equation can be the old rst plus the old third equation, etc). By combining easily these two transformations, it is always possible to decrease slightly the lenght of the public key.
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Idea 1: It is possible to make a change of variables such that the rst equation is in a canonical form (see 11], chapter 6). With this presentation of the public key, the length of the public key will be approximately n?1 n times the initial length. times the initial length.
Remark: As we will see in section 13, the most e cient way of reducing the length of the public key is to choose carefully the values q and n.
11 Another variation of the schemes: Unbalanced Oil, Vinegar and Salt
The scheme Let (A) be a set of n quadratic \Oil and Vinegar" equations, as described above, with n oil variables and v vinegar variables. We denote by (q 1 ; :::; q n ) these equations. Let (A 0 ) be a set of r truly trandom quadratic equations in all the variables (i.e. we can have terms in a i a j where a i and a j are oil variables in (A 0 ) but not in (A)). We denote by (q 0 1 ; :::; q 0 n ) these equations. We will call these r equations the \salt" equations.
Let t be a secret a ne permutation of K n+r ! K n+r . Let (P) be the set of the equations t(q 1 , :::, q n , q 0 1 , :::, q 0 r ). We denote by P 1 , ..., P n+r these equations of (P). (P) will be the public key (i.e. we have \mixed" Oil and Vinegar quadratic equations and truly random quadratic equations with a secret a ne permutation (P).
Let y 2 K n+r be the hash of a message M to be signed (or y =Hash(Mjj0010jjR)) where R is a random value with no 0010 in base 2). Let x 2 K n+v . Then x is a valid signature of y if P(x) = y (i.e. if 8i, 1 i n + r, P i (x) = y i ). When the secret a ne functions s and t are known, it is feasible to compute a valid signature after approximately O(q r ) computations because we will easily compute a solution for the n equations (A)
as before, and the probability that this solution also satis es the r equations (A 0 ) is 1 q r (we will try again with another random R until we succeed). When q r is small (for example if q 256 and r 2), this is clearly feasible. (The name \salt" comes from the fact that we cannot put a lot of salt equations since q r must stay small for e ciency.)
Cryptanalysis when v = n
Here we assume that v = n. Let G i and G j be random linear sums of the n + r equations (P). The probability that G i and G j are linear sums of only the n equations (A) is (1=q r ) 2 (because it is 1=q r for G i and 1=q r for G j ). If this occurs, then from G i and G j , we will attack the scheme exactly as described in 10]. Therefore, if v = n, the scheme can be attacked with a complexity approximately q 2r (and for the legitimate user, computing a signature has a complexity approximately O(q r )). As a result, we do not recommend to use this variation when v = n.
The case v > n
For well chosen parameters, we have seen that we do not know how to attack Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar schemes. Therefore, of course, we do not know either how to attack the schemes when the two ideas { v > n and mixing the equations with truly random equations { are combined together. However, the idea of choosing v > n seems at the present to be a stronger idea (both for security and for practical implementations) than the idea of mixing Oil and Vinegar with truly random equations. 12 12 Another scheme: HFEV The Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar schemes and the HFE schemes of 14] can very easily be combined, as we will see in this section. Moreover, the combined scheme looks very e cient since (at the present) we are able to avoid all the known attacks with more e cient choices of the parameters. So this HFEV schemes look both more e cient (because a smaller degree d looks su cient for security) and more secure compared to the original HFE scheme. HFEV is also more e cient (but more complex) compared to UOV, because very few vinegar variables are needed.
The scheme (HFEV) And in (1), let now 0 be an element of F q n such that each one of the n components of 0 in a basis is a secret random quadratic function of the variables a 0 1 , ..., a 0 v . Then, the n + v variables a 1 , ..., a n , a 0 1 , ..., a 0 v will be mixed in the secret a ne bijection s in order to obtain the variables x 1 , ..., x n+v . And, as before, t(b 1 ; :::; b n ) = (y 1 ; :::; y n ), where t is a secret a ne bijection. Then the public key is given as the n equations y i = P i (x 1 ; :::; x n+v ). To compute a signature, the vinegar values a 0 1 , ..., a 0 v will simply be chosen at random. Then, the values 0 and i will be computed. Then, the monovariate equations (1) will be solved (in a) in F q n .
Simulations
Nicolas Courtois did some simulations on HFEV and, in all his simulations, when the number of vinegar variables is 3, there is no a ne multiple equations of small degree (which is very nice).
Example: Let where: a = (a 1 ; :::; a n ), where a 1 , ..., a n are the \oil" variables. 
